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## CIA's Dual Role

As the Administration proceeds with its inside investigation of the Cuban invasion fiasco, the leading candidate for Scapegoat No. 1 is obviously the Central Intelligence Agency. This cloak-and-dagger outfit, successor to the wartime OSS, was plainly up to its ears not only in the intelligence phase but in the training, arming and "unleashing" of the Cuban rebels.

If we are to learn and apply the right lessons, however, we will do well to avoid excessive haste or glibness in pointing the blame. (As one high Administration spokesman glumly put it: No need to hurry, there is enough blame to go around so that everyone concerned can be sure of getting an ample slice.) And even while assessing CIA's share of the responsibility, we can well draw a sharp line—the very line that should have been drawn by Congress on the CIA long ago—between its two highly contradictory roles in this affair.

For the real question, if CIA blundered, is whether it blundered most as an intelligence agency or as a covert operations agency for military or para-military adventures. It is the latter function which the CIA, by the very nature of its original charter, should not have been assigned, and should not be assigned in the future.

One of the main reasons for creating the CIA in 1947 as an independent agency directly under the National Security Council, after all, was to take the co-ordination-of-intelligence job away from all the policy agencies (Pentagon, State Department, etc.) with their separate service or policy viewpoints. In this way, it was thought, we could avoid having intelligence colored or distorted by the kind of wishful thinking that invariably colors the attitude of anyone wedded to a particular line of action or policy.

But if this was basic in the thinking that gave CIA separate status in the first place, it was compromised at the very outset by the fact that the CIA was comprised from the beginning of the remnants of the OSS, which was very much an underground operating (as distinct from intelligence-gathering) agency throughout the war. The whole experience of many CIA-men, in short, was in plotting and counter-plotting, working with foreign underground groups and the like.

More and more in recent years, the criticism swirling around the CIA has concerned its covert and sometimes clumsy operations in the field of subversive warfare rather than its primary role as an intelligence agency. But if the original concept of divorcing intelligence from operations was sound—as we have even better reason now to believe it was—then it makes sense to reinstate that concept as one lesson of the

The Administration is reported planning to shift most of the operational functions, which the CIA has gathered under its wing by special assignment from the National Security Council, back to the Department of Defense which seems sensible to us. If we are heading into an era of intensified counter-subversive operations, of matching Communist infiltration fire with counter-fire, then we had better develop this whole apparatus for covert warfare under auspices separate and distinct from the CIA. And we had also better make sure that the foreign operations in both areas—intelligence and counter-subversion—are conducted under far stricter supervision of the top civilian policy-making echelons than has been the case on some sad occasions of recent note.